APPLYING THE THIRA TO SPECIAL EVENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING ADOPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS by Bradley, Daniel J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-12
APPLYING THE THIRA TO SPECIAL EVENTS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CAPABILITIES-BASED
PLANNING ADOPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Bradley, Daniel J.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61315
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








APPLYING THE THIRA TO SPECIAL EVENTS:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR CAPABILITIES-BASED 
PLANNING ADOPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
by 
Daniel J. Bradley 
December 2018 
Thesis Advisor: Wayne Porter 
Second Reader: Christopher Bellavita (contractor) 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
APPLYING THE THIRA TO SPECIAL EVENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING ADOPTION IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel J. Bradley
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 Determining preparedness across the United States’ homeland security enterprise (HSE) is a complex task because 
the nation’s overall disaster management capability is an aggregation of the independently developed capabilities of 
local and state agencies. In 2012, FEMA promulgated a six-step capabilities-based planning (CBP) framework, the 
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), to standardize how states and major cities assess 
preparedness. CBP is a non-linear planning process used within the Department of Defense (DoD) to determine how 
military capabilities should develop to ensure success in future conflicts, despite uncertainty around threats, actors, and 
theaters. 
 This thesis proposes increasing CBP adoption by state and local governments through incorporating an adapted 
THIRA methodology into recurring, real-world interagency activities, such as mass-gathering contingency planning. An 
expanded THIRA framework is synthesized, which completes an initial DoD CBP sequence in the context of local 
government planning for a special event. Three policy options are developed that evaluate the adapted THIRA 
framework’s implementation in these scenarios: no adoption, use in a local government-planned event, and adoption 
within a national special security event (NSSE). This thesis recommends implementing a THIRA framework into 
special-event planning to allow interagency stakeholders to perform and adapt CBP locally in real-world collaborative 
environments. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS



















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
99
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
APPLYING THE THIRA TO SPECIAL EVENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING ADOPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Daniel J. Bradley 
Emergency Manager, Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management 
BA, New Jersey Institute of Technology, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2018 
Approved by: Wayne Porter 
 Advisor 
 Christopher Bellavita 
 Second Reader 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Chair for Instruction 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Determining preparedness across the United States’ homeland security enterprise 
(HSE) is a complex task because the nation’s overall disaster management capability is 
an aggregation of the independently developed capabilities of local and state agencies. In 
2012, FEMA promulgated a six-step capabilities-based planning (CBP) framework, the 
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), to standardize how 
states and major cities assess preparedness. CBP is a non-linear planning process used 
within the Department of Defense (DoD) to determine how military capabilities should 
develop to ensure success in future conflicts, despite uncertainty around threats, actors, 
and theaters. 
 This thesis proposes increasing CBP adoption by state and local governments 
through incorporating an adapted THIRA methodology into recurring, real-world 
interagency activities, such as mass-gathering contingency planning. An expanded 
THIRA framework is synthesized, which completes an initial DoD CBP sequence in the 
context of local government planning for a special event. Three policy options are 
developed that evaluate the adapted THIRA framework’s implementation in these 
scenarios: no adoption, use in a local government-planned event, and adoption within a 
national special security event (NSSE). This thesis recommends implementing a THIRA 
framework into special-event planning to allow interagency stakeholders to perform and 
adapt CBP locally in real-world collaborative environments.  
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Local officials planning for disasters at the local level must make risk-informed 
judgments about what capability is needed to defend against known threats and hazards 
while remaining adaptable to address the unforeseen. However, risk assessment tools are 
imperfect and sometimes not available to local governments. Presidential Policy Directive 
8 (PPD-8) and the THIRA process have sought to address this gap through application of 
a variant of military capabilities-based planning (CBP) framework to the homeland security 
enterprise, but implementation has been difficult. CBP is a method of system analysis that 
focuses on identifying and assessing the necessary elements required for a specific outcome 
under user-defined metrics of performance.1 CBP applies abstraction to an array of 
complex threat scenarios to identify essential capabilities required to address a 
comprehensive range of unique operational challenges. Differing from military planning 
environments, local government efforts with CBP are complicated by a gap in analytical 
capacity and local disaster assets diffused among many different organizations. This 
difference has proven to be an obstacle to full adoption of CBP across governmental 
jurisdictions. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The implementation challenges for the National Preparedness System’s Threat and 
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and its CBP framework are that 
disasters vary across the United States, and despite reducing complexity through focusing 
on core capabilities, risk assessment and performance measurement competencies are not 
widely available nor incentivized to be developed among stakeholders at the state and local 
level.2 Many jurisdictions reported in a 2014 study that the THIRA is the only risk and 
capability assessment performed at the local level, and is done primarily because it is tied 
                                                 
1 Doug Hales and Paul Chouinard, Implementing Capability Based Planning within the Public Safety 
and Security Sector: Lessons from the Defence Experience (Ottawa, Ontario: Defence R&D Canada –
Centre for Security Science, 2011), 1. 
2 Jerome H. Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” Homeland Security Affairs 10, no. 2 
(February 2014): 8, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/252. 
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to securing preparedness grant funds.3 Moreover, respondents within the same study 
indicated a preference for less complex assessment methodologies and favored locally 
developed approaches.4  
In parallel to the homeland security enterprise, military CBP applies a similar 
analysis framework as the THIRA, but differs in that the strategic focus of the exercise is 
often placed on mission-level, not full-scale conflict scenarios.5 In applying this scaled 
relationship to national preparedness, disasters scenarios can be substituted for full-scale 
war scenarios but this relationship lacks an analog for a civilian-side equivalent to 
“mission.” 
For domestic preparedness, special events can offer an analog to the military’s 
CBP’s term, mission. The characteristics of special events: frequency of occurrence, 
necessity for risk-informed protection and response asset deployments, media attention, 
required interdisciplinary planning, and potential for real-world consequences, appear to 
have an analogous equivalency with mission. This equivalency suggests that FEMA’s work 
on PPD-8 and the THIRA, challenged by the issue of low competency and incentive in 
practicing CBP can potentially be addressed by inculcating elements of CBP and the 
THIRA into special event planning. 
B. ADAPTED THIRA CBP FRAMEWORK 
A comparison was conducted between the FEMA THIRA methodology and the 
analytical architecture of a CBP framework developed for the Secretary of Defense in 
2002. This assessment mapped the similarity between Paul K. Davis’s CBP framework and 
FEMA’s THIRA methodology, and found congruence, as well as options for expanding 
the THIRA’s CBP approach. Next, special event planning processes and interagency 
dynamics were explored and validated as an approximation of jurisdiction-wide disaster 
                                                 
3 Seung-Ho An et al., Integrated Risk Management at the Local Level: The Gap between Theory and 
Practice (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 2014), 16–19, http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154253. 
4 An et al., 16–19. 
5 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and 
Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 21–28. 
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planning environments. A THIRA special event planning framework that completes a full-
CBP cycle was synthesized containing the following steps: assess threats and risks; give 
them context; construct capability targets; assess options and capability; choose options; 
and apply the results and measurement. This adapted THIRA framework completes an 
initial Department of Defense (DoD) CBP sequence in the context of local government 
planning for a special event, beginning with an initial risk assessment and concluding when 
deployed resources are demobilized from the mass gathering venue.  
C. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
Three policy options were developed that evaluate the adapted THIRA 
framework’s implementation in the following scenarios: no adoption, use in a local 
government-planned event, and adoption within a national special security event (NSSE). 
The metrics selected to evaluate these policy options were drawn from literature examining 
the best practices for CBP implementation and collaboration-enabling factors within 
emergency management planning. High degrees of top leader participation, substantial 
time for interagency collaboration on a specific mission, opportunities to partition all the 
required core capabilities for a mission, and integrating a CBP champion were identified 
to have positive effects on successfully implementing CBP. From this analysis, option 
three, integrate the THIRA into a NSSE planning process, was identified as the most 
desirable policy option for implementation, as it maximized the values of each metric more 
so than other options. 
D. CONCLUSION 
NSSE’s are high-interest events that require managing large budgets, conducting 
substantial interagency planning, and specifying the need for large amounts of local 
equipment and security apparatus. NSSE planning timeframes typically operate in the 6–
12-month range and draw notable media attention, both before and during the event. 
Additionally, the current NSSE planning framework is comprised of functional 
subcommittees that address specific categories of tasks, which mirror the CBP approach of 
decomposing scenarios into unique operational challenges and then into discrete envelopes 
of capability.  
xviii 
While NSSEs provide a notable set of enabling factors for implementing CBP for 
real-world events, they occur very infrequently and impact only a limited set of cities and 
states a year.6 NSSEs for political conventions shift from city to city, which means that 
local governments may practice CBP once for a NSSE and then lack the component 
incentives or enabling factors to continue using CBP.  
It is also likely that full adoption of CBP is not possible given the variation and 
diffusion of government organizations at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial level, 
which contrasts with the (slightly) less complex military organizations within the DoD.7 
This observed variation does not suggest that CBP adoption for the homeland security 
enterprise (HSE) should be discontinued. Davis notes that modern military planning has 
had decades and large conflicts to iterate and test planning approaches, whereas the HSE’s 
experience with CBP began in 2004.8 Despite the lack of frequency in applying the THIRA 
CBP framework to a NSSE, it may represent an opportunity for FEMA to study CBP 
application in a real-world disaster-analogous setting. 
  
                                                 
6 Shawn Reese, National Special Security Events: Fact Sheet, CRS Report No. R43522 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1–3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43522.pdf.  
7 The phrase, “federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level’ is drawn from FEMA planning literature 
and refers to federal disaster planning approaches including the whole of government. For more info, see 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Implementation Objectives for Local, State, Tribal and 
Territorial Jurisdictions, 2018 Update (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 1, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/15278478203190c604c12c628b5a8119fb8d08c4ed07c/
NIMS_Implementation_Objectives_FINAL_20180530.pdf.  
8 Sharon L. Caudle, “Homeland Security and Capabilities-Based Planning: Improving National 
Preparedness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 19–26. 
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Preparing for disasters is a complex undertaking. Disasters come in different sizes 
and from many different means. A jurisdiction must contend with natural hazards, such as 
extreme heat and tornados, the failure of human systems like power grids and bridges, and 
adversarial acts like terrorism. Some disasters provide early warning and a degree of 
probability, like the march of a hurricane coming up a coast, while others are instantaneous 
and cannot be accurately predicted, such as the bombing of the Boston Marathon. 
A. DISASTERS AND RISK ASSESSMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Assessing local disaster risk is challenged by uncertainty and imperfect assessment 
methodologies. Emergency managers and local governments prepare for disasters by 
assessing the risk the jurisdiction faces from a spectrum containing any and all natural, 
technological, and human-caused scenarios: determining the likelihood of, vulnerability to, 
and consequences from each.1 Beginning with natural hazards, forecasting, probabilistic 
models, and review of environmental factors can give planners a reasonable degree of 
confidence in assessing hazard risk.2 Predicting system failures is more difficult than 
studying hurricanes, as many utilities are privately owned, structures are unable to be fully 
inspected, and interdependencies are often not well understood due to the infrequency of 
major system failures. Assessing terrorism is substantially more challenging because the 
behavior of an adversary cannot be fully predicted, including why and where a target is 
selected, how it is attacked, and when the attack occurs. From these examples, the variables 
involved in assessing risk can quickly become impossible to account for fully, which 
increases uncertainty in the conclusions reached by local governments. 
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations 
Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), 4–1. 
2 For national-level examples of probability and modeling for natural hazards, refer to the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization National Hurricane Center’s hurricane track, intensity, and time-to-
impact capabilities: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/. For examples of modeling, refer to FEMA’s HAZUS 
software, which allows for impact modeling from a variety of natural hazards, such as hurricanes and 
earthquakes: https://www.fema.gov/hazus.  
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B. THE ECONOMIES OF LOCAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
After risk is determined, a jurisdiction must make strategic decisions about what 
level of risk is acceptable, how government will organize to prepare for events deemed 
more likely to happen, and how much capability should be built and maintained for those 
types of occurrences.3 Threats and hazards can also vary in scale, duration, and intensity, 
which inherently introduce more variables and uncertainty into this decision-making 
process. Basing investments in preparedness around the impacts of a category one 
hurricane when a city is at high risk from category three storms will ensure that local 
response fails to meet expectations.  
Strategic preparedness planning at the local level competes with daily operating 
obligations for stakeholder time, analytical capacity, and incentives for effective 
participation. A city’s decisions about disaster risk and preparedness must address 
uncertainty, but also occur within an economic framework.4 Preparing for disasters is 
expensive and time consuming for a local government, which is forced to balance use of 
budgets and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant dollars, level of 
effort, and participation for disaster preparedness activities against the daily, essential 
services a city must deliver. Strategic-level planning processes compete for stakeholder 
and local government focus among daily, lower-order preparedness activities. In summary, 
local governments must decide how to expend funds and effort to increase preparedness 
for disasters under uncertainty, with imperfect tools, and in a limited incentive and 
participation environment.  
Since 2003, FEMA has administered billions of dollars in preparedness grants to 
states and large cities with the goal of building local capability to prevent, prepare, respond, 
and recover from disasters.5 FEMA has frequently testified to Congress and has been asked 
                                                 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, 
4-15–4-16. 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 4-1–4-6. 
5 Shawn Reese, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, CRS 
Report No. R44669 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 14, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
homesec/R44669.pdf. 
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what the return on investment is for preparedness grants. The question in its most simplified 
form is that Quantitatively, what has this funding bought in disaster preparedness 
capability? The question has been a difficult one to answer, as noted in numerous 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) findings and other congressional read-outs.6 
FEMA has been challenged to define the current level of national preparedness in a 
quantifiable way. These challenges are rooted in the complexity of mapping and measuring 
the systems of interrelationships and interdependencies of assets, trained personnel, plans, 
political will, and many other factors across a spectrum including all levels of government; 
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial.7 Nevertheless, national-level actions to apply 
measurement to preparedness are needed to identify gaps effectively where more effort 
should be expended. 
C. PPD-8 AND THE THIRA 
President Obama’s White House released Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) on 
March 30, 2011, which set new standards on the way national preparedness should be 
conceptualized, structured, and assessed.8 PPD-8 established core capabilities that 
represented the critical tasks and functions, “necessary to prepare for the specific types of 
incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation [... and a set of] prioritized 
objectives to mitigate that risk.”9 FEMA’s implementation of PPD-8 led to the National 
Preparedness Framework, National Preparedness Goal, and the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process. In this implementation, FEMA 
introduces capabilities-based planning (CBP), which encourages developing skills that can 
be used in any disaster, rather than scenario-based planning, which builds capacity only 
from the result of detailed study on a limited number of threats and hazards.  
                                                 
6 William O. Jenkins, Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Little Progress in 
Assessing National Capabilities, GAO-11-260T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2011), 4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125853.pdf.  
7 Jerome H. Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” Homeland Security Affairs 10, no. 2 
(February 2014): 2, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/252. 
8 Kahan, 2. 
9 Kahan, 2. 
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From PPD-8, FEMA’s new capability-focused doctrine established within the 
National Preparedness System applies simplification methods to the complexity of 
preparing for an array of threats and hazards by focusing on the common outputs, or 
essential tasks, that any disaster requires, rather than the threats and hazards themselves.10 
FEMA defines capability as “the means to accomplish a mission, function, or objective 
based on the performance of related tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of 
performance.”11 FEMA builds upon the concept of capability focused-planning in the 
National Preparedness Goal, by clarifying that from capabilities, a limited subset of further 
simplified core capabilities represent the “distinct critical elements necessary for … 
success” that should be possessed by every government jurisdiction.12 FEMA’s now 32 
core capabilities comprehensively include both single organization specializations, such as 
fire suppression and more multi-organization interdependent functions, as well as 
sheltering a large segment of displaced persons.13  
In 2012, FEMA introduced the THIRA process as an annual requirement for states 
and urban area security initiatives (UASIs) to complete.14 FEMA then aggregates state and 
urban area THIRA data to complete a National Preparedness Report. The THIRA 
methodology, recently updated in 2018, consists of a six-step process that: 
• Complies an array of plausible threats and hazards that could impact a 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness System (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 1–5. 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1-5. 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1-5. 
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 1–5. 
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 
201, 3rd. ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 7. 
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• Crafts each threat and hazard into disaster scenarios where the maximum 
consequences are calculated and grouped as metrics relative each core 
capability. 
• Facilitates an inter-disciplinary decision-making process where 
stakeholders deliberate, for each core capability, what amount of 
consequence metric the jurisdiction should train, equip, plan, and exercise 
to be able to accomplish in a set period, for any disaster. The results of this 
process are referred to as capability targets. 
• Facilitates a process where current jurisdictional ability to perform each 
core capability is assessed, independent of all other capabilities. 
• Identifies gaps that may exist between existing capability and the 
determined capability targets, and facilitates discussion of what actions to 
take over time to minimize capability shortfalls.  
• Examines the role of local and grant contributions in building disaster 
preparedness by assessing investments over time relative to each core 
capability.15 
The implementation challenges for the National Preparedness System’s THIRA 
and its CBP framework are that disasters vary across the United States, and despite 
reducing complexity through focusing on core capabilities, risk assessment and 
performance measurement competencies are not widely available nor incentivized to be 
developed among stakeholders at the state and local level.16 Additionally, many 
jurisdictions reported in a 2014 study that the THIRA is the only risk and capability 
assessment performed at the local level, and is done so only annually.17 Moreover, 
respondents within the same study indicated a preference for less complex assessment 
                                                 
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3rd ed., 8–10. 
16 Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” 8. 
17 Seung-Ho An et al., Integrated Risk Management at the Local Level: The Gap between Theory and 
Practice (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 2014), 16–19, http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154253.  
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methodologies and favored locally developed approaches.18 The current external incentive 
for states and urban areas to complete a THIRA is that it is a pre-requisite to receive FEMA 
preparedness grants.  
In parallel to the homeland security enterprise, military CBP applies a similar 
analysis framework as the THIRA, but differs in that strategic focus of the exercise is often 
placed on mission-level, not full-scale conflict scenarios.19 In applying this scaled 
relationship to national preparedness, disasters scenarios can be substituted for full-scale 
war scenarios but this relationship lacks an analog for a civilian-side equivalent to 
“mission.” 
For domestic preparedness, special events can offer an analog to the military’s 
CBP’s term, mission. The characteristics of special events: frequency of occurrence, 
necessity for risk-informed protection and response asset deployments, media attention, 
required interdisciplinary planning, and potential for real-world consequences appear to 
have an analogous equivalency with mission. This equivalency suggests that that FEMA’s 
work on PPD-8 and the THIRA, challenged by the issue of low competency and incentive 
in practicing CBP can potentially be addressed by inculcating elements of CBP and the 
THIRA into special event planning. Planning for special events carries participation 
incentives and commonly occurs with greater than annual frequency. Increased practice 
with CBP at the local level can contribute to the goals established by PPD-8. 
This thesis explores potential congruency between a DoD CBP framework and 
FEMA’s application of CBP under PPD-8 to identify potential opportunities to apply 
THIRA planning approaches to special events. Policy options analysis are applied to 
explore the simulated performance of several options for implementing THIRA and CBP 
methodologies into special event planning.  
                                                 
18 An et al., 16–19. 
19 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and 
Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 21–28. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTION, DESIGN, AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
Thus, the research question of this thesis is: How can the THIRA methodology be 
enhanced with elements of capabilities-based planning to support localized, expedient, and 
situation-specific decision support for special event risk and resource assessment? 
This thesis’s hypothesis is that if the THIRA can be adapted to support planning for 
special events, which occur more frequently than the now triennially-required FEMA 
process, then the multidisciplinary groups involved in event planning may accrue 
competency in the goals of PPD-8; specifically familiarity with CBP, as well as a better 
understanding their organization’s metrics of performance.20 In turn, this adaptation may 
lead to advances in National Incident Management System (NIMS)-typing efforts and 
incentives at the local level to complement those undertaken by FEMA under PPD-8.21 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The primary consumers of this thesis are state and local governments that 
frequently need to assess risk in a tactical way to inform appropriate courses of action (e.g., 
resourcing).22 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may have a strategic interest, 
as risk and capability assessment methodologies like the THIRA are soon conducted only 
triennially by states and UASIs as part of the FEMA’s PPD-8 implementation.23 Outcomes 
from this effort may inform policy and tool development at FEMA to support state and 
local jurisdictions in building further competency in CBP. Additionally, an increase in risk 
assessment and capability estimation at the state and local level will contribute to PPD-8’s 
                                                 
20 The THIRA has been an annual requirement since 2012. After 2019, the THIRA will become a 
triennial requirement, while stakeholder preparedness review (SPR) capability assessment will be required 
annually. 
21 For examples of current NIMS-typing definitions, see https://rtlt.preptoolkit.fema.gov/Public.  
22 The term “tactical” is used to indicate action performed for a specific occurrence or event, rather 
than the overall risk faced by the jurisdiction.  
23 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “PPD-8 Overview Presentation” (presentation, 
Department of Homeland Security, April 12, 2013), http://eden.lsu.edu/Conferences/SCAP/Documents/ 
Eric Runnels.pdf. 
 8 
goals, which have seen a greater emphasis from FEMA for local jurisdictions being able to 
articulate their own risk and defend their conclusions on how best to mitigate it.24  
The ability to defend conclusions on the level of protection warranted for a special 
event is equally valuable. Mass gatherings have become targets of terrorism and local 
jurisdictions in most cases are responsible for determining appropriate levels of prevention, 
protection, and response assets. With multitudes of annual and novel events each year, 
establishing a standardized process to assess and reach consensus on risk and inherent event 
vulnerabilities can provide jurisdictions with a repeatable and objective mechanism to 
optimize how final resourcing is reached.  
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II of this thesis conducts a literature review examining the current THIRA 
methodology, the general framework of CBP, approaches and limitations of risk 
assessment, the current range of decision support systems, and the role of interdisciplinary 
collaboration and effective organizational incentives observed in emergency management 
planning. Chapter III examines THIRA and CBP process frameworks to synthesize a 
hybrid FEMA/CBP planning process for applications in special event interagency 
planning. In applying this process, Chapter IV constructs policy options for the 
implementation of the hybrid-planning framework into two primary types of special event 
planning processes, local events and national special security events (NSSEs). Chapter V 
conducts policy options analysis, applies the methodology of Bardach and Patasknik, and 
assesses the simulated performance of each policy option under qualitative criteria 
identified to influence collaboration positively among a diverse group of planning 
stakeholders. 
                                                 
24 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018–2022: Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 4–9. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE THIRA AND QUANTIFYING CAPABILITY  
The THIRA is a risk ranking and capability assessment process that is a requirement 
for all UASI metropolitan regions and states. It is a nationwide activity led by FEMA to 
execute PPD-8. The output of jurisdictional THIRAs yields capability targets and requires 
localities to assess what resources and abilities they possess that can be applied to meet 
these goals.25 
PPD-8’s critical elements of action included the formulation of a national 
preparedness goal, which through a Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) and the 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG), identified 32 core capabilities to guide federal, state, 
and local stakeholders in developing resources, training, and organizational changes to 
meet requirements.26 The THIRA was implemented as a jurisdictional version of the SNRA 
to assist states and urban areas to identify threats of concern, develop contextualized targets 
for the 32 core capabilities, and to prioritize what gaps in local capability should be focused 
on for risk reduction.27 The results of each jurisdictional THIRA are aggregated by FEMA 
into an annual National Preparedness Report (NPR).28 
This aggregation provides FEMA with a broad spectrum of locally identified threats 
and hazards of concern and geographically specific capability and resource gaps.29 As 
discussed earlier, the THIRA represents a hybrid planning process that begins with threat 
and hazard scenarios planning but yields capabilities-based performance targets, such as 
                                                 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 19–30.  
26 Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” 2–4. 
27 Kahan, 2–4. 
28 Department of Homeland Security, 2017 National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 101–102. 
29 Department of Homeland Security, 101–102. 
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having the local capability to process 250 deceased persons within a 24-hour operational 
period.30  
The THIRA is a six-step process, and steps one through three have been addressed 
previously within Chapter I. This section reviews the current efficacy and challenges of the 
THIRA methodology’s previous Step Four: Assess Current Capability. Within FEMA’s 
THIRA planning guidance document, Comprehensive Planning Guide 201, 2nd ed., step 
four states: 
Communities should identify resources at a manageable level of detail. 
Identifying teams or ‘packages’ of people, equipment, and associated 
training allows for comparison across jurisdictions. These resources handle 
specific tasks within specified timeframes.31 
The approach presented to users of this section of the guide is twofold, (1) apply 
NIMS typing to current assets and teams, and (2) develop packages of assets and personnel 
to accomplish specific types of missions, sometimes referred to as mission-ready packages 
(MRPs). NIMS typing is a federal effort through FEMA to create standardized descriptions 
of teams and other resources, such that the elements of teams and their capabilities are 
applied uniformly across the nation, and as such, are interoperable.32 An example of a 
national NIMS typed asset is an urban search and rescue team, which has standardized 
roles, equipment and highly prescribed capability levels that must be maintained to remain 
a typed asset.33 
While nearly every jurisdiction has become NIMS compliant in regards to the 
adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS), NIMS typing has not been widely 
                                                 
30 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 19–20. 
31 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 
201, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 16. 
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 1–3. For more background on NIMS typing 
details, see https://rtlt.preptoolkit.fema.gov/Public. 
33 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Resource Typing Definition for Mass Search and Rescue 
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 1–10, 
https://rtlt.preptoolkit.fema.gov/Public/Resource/ViewFile/8-508-1160?type=Pdf&p=17. 
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adopted at local levels of government.34 Local adoption of NIMS typing does not often 
adhere to national qualification standards, as typing criteria include specific qualifications 
and training elements that lie outside of normal operational responsibilities, or the 
administrative burden to maintain qualification exceeds a specific department’s operational 
capability.35 Kahan raises this issue in “W(h)ither PPD-8,” where he argues that PPD-8, 
and inherently the THIRA, rely on complex analytical approaches to assessing 
performance that require competencies not commonly found in state and local 
governments.36 Paul K. Davis, the author of a highly cited monograph on applying CPB to 
defense planning, states that assessing disaster performance in the civilian environment is 
more challenging than in military contexts, due to the diffusion of disaster capability across 
multitudes of different organizations.37  
NIMS forms the national, foundational basis for a standardized response to any 
incident in any jurisdiction by establishing adaptable command and control structures, from 
which NIMS typed resources can be requested or assigned to support.38 A national review 
of the adoption of NIMS, specific to ICS, found that the disaster response across the United 
States continues to be challenged by issues in communication, coordination, collaboration, 
and leadership between organizations.39 These issues identified in the study speak largely 
to interorganizational coordination failures in pre-event preparedness, planning, and 
training as root causes.40  
                                                 
34 Mark G. Stigler, “Strategy for Upgrading Preparedness in Small and Rural Communities to Meet 
National Preparedness Standards” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 6–10. 
35 Stigler, 6–10. 
36 Kahan, “Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8?,” 6–8. 
37 Davis, Analytic Architecture, 21–28. 
38 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident, 1–2. 
39 Jessica Jensen and William L. Waugh Jr., “The United States’ Experience with the Incident 
Command System: What We Think We Know and What We Need to Know More About,” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 22, no. 1 (March 2014): 6, doi: 10.1111/1468-5973.12034. 
40 Kay Sullivan Faith, Brian A. Jackson, and Henry Willis, “Text Analysis of After Action Reports to 
Support Improved Emergency Response Planning,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 8, no. 1, art. 57 (2011): 10–13, 10.2202/1547-7355.1900. 
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B. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING 
CBP is a method of system analysis that focuses on identifying and assessing the 
necessary elements required for a specific outcome under user-defined metrics of 
performance.41 CBP focuses on organizational outputs and shifts the analytical focus when 
working towards an objective from “what do we have?” to “what do we need to do?”42 The 
methodology focuses on building a spectrum of options that can achieve desired outputs 
by assessing their performance under uncertainty through qualitative and quantitative 
approaches including subject matter expert elicitation and parametric exploration, 
respectively.43 Variants of CBP have found frequent application in corporate strategy, 
manufacturing efficiency assessment and information technology (IT) system design and 
computer architecture, including machine learning. Most notably, CBP is a prominent 
element within military strategic planning and this area of application is the focus of 
review.  
CBP re-emerged as a Department of Defense (DoD) change in strategic force 
planning doctrine in the early 2000s, which moved from a narrower threat-specific method 
towards an analytical process that favors modularity, agility and adaptability.44 Introduced 
formally via Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
CBP’s application to force planning built on previous iterations of CBP within the DoD 
that supported nuclear security and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations 
                                                 
41 Doug Hales and Paul Chouinard, Implementing Capability Based Planning within the Public Safety 
and Security Sector: Lessons from the Defence Experience (Ottawa, Ontario: Defence R&D Canada – 
Centre for Security Science, 2011), 1. 
42 The Technical Cooperation Program, TTCP Technical Report: Guide to Capability-based Planning 
(Washington, DC: The Technical Cooperation Program, n.d.), 2, accessed October 10, 2018, https://www. 
acq.osd.mil/ttcp/reference/docs/jsa-tp-3-cbp-paper-final.doc. 
43 For parametric exploratory analysis, see Patrick Mills et al., Estimating Air Force Deployment 
Requirements for Lean Force Packages: A Methodology and Decision Support Tool Prototype (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2017). For CBP exploring SME and information system interactions, see Stephen 
Duhan, “A Capabilities Based Toolkit for Strategic Information Systems Planning in SMEs,” International 
Journal of Information Management 27, no. 5 (2007): 352–367, doi: 10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2007.03.001. For 
general business applications, see Paul Leinwand, Cesare Mainardi, and Art Kleiner, “Develop Your 
Company’s Cross-Functional Capabilities,” Harvard Business Review, February 2, 2016, https://hbr.org/
2016/02/develop-your-companys-cross-functional-capabilities. For machine leaning applications, see 
Martin Pelikan and David E. Goldberg, “A Hierarchy Machine: Learning to Optimize from Nature and 
Humans,” Complexity 8, no. 5 (2003): 36–45, doi: 10.1002/cplx.10103. 
44 Davis, Analytic Architecture, xi. 
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decades earlier.45 Within the DoD policy and planning spaces, CBP has been inculcated 
into processes for a spectrum of activities that ranged from officer education to quick-
response asset portfolio assessment for the Air Force.46  
Following the 2001 QDR re-introduction of CBP, a variety of literature exists that 
explores how best to integrate CBP into strategic defense planning. The most cited is a 
monograph by Paul K. Davis titled: Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, 
Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation. Davis’s methodology is summarized as 
follows since it presents a strategic method of application for the entire DoD, rather than 
issue- or branch-specific applications, such as A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army 
Security Cooperation, which applies CBP methods to address international partnerships to 
counter asymmetrical warfare.47  
In Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System 
Analysis, and Transformation, Davis presents a general analytical framework for the 
entirety of defense strategic planning.48 Plausible name-level scenarios are identified and 
then translated into full narratives by adding context (e.g., time of year, enemy force 
strength, etc.). From the fully contextualized scenarios, a list of required capabilities 
needed to ensure operational success is determined. Capabilities in this process represent 
the essential functions, actions, and competencies that combine to achieve a specific 
outcome, but cannot be reasonably reduced further into more sub-elements or constituent 
parts. A comprehensive list of every single required critical action is superfluous, as most 
of the more strategic capabilities will emerge naturally, such as the Navy maintaining port 
security in a conflict.49 Again, the assessment is simplified to focus only on capabilities 
needed to overcome unique operational challenges, like halting an enemy maneuver, which 
                                                 
45 Davis, 84–87. 
46 Mills et al., Estimating Air Force Deployment Requirements for Lean Force Packages, x-xi; 
Margaret C. Harrell et al., A Strategic Approach to Joint Officer Management: Analysis and Modeling 
Results (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 1-5. 
47 Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Adam Grissom, and Jefferson P. Marquis, A Capabilities-Based Strategy 
for Army Security Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 6. 
48 Davis, Analytic Architecture, xi. 
49 Davis, xi. 
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inherently aggregate to represent the sub-elements of activity that make up a full-scale 
military conflict.50 This simplification of war fighting brings analytical focus to the 
required capabilities for success at the mission level.51 Davis states, “Since missions are 
building blocks or modules of campaigns, they are appropriate modules on which to focus 
capabilities-based planning.”52 
The framework then proposes that “for a given operational challenge, consider a 
set of options for meeting the challenge; apply mission-system analysis methods across a 
wide range of circumstances to generate a comparative assessment of the options with 
appropriate metrics.”53 This mission-system analysis space is meant to evaluate capabilities 
and asset trade-offs under highly uncertain circumstances, such as warning time and 
capability of adversarial units, as well as economic frameworks.54 Davis offers exploratory 
analysis as the main analytical approach. Exploratory analysis is a process to gain a broad 
understanding of the overarching problem space before shifting focus to the details of 
particular capabilities.55 Ranges of uncertainty, like the performance of a public safety 
taskforce in a variety of scenarios, are often represented graphically. Additionally, 
exploratory analysis can be conducted via both qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
concluding result of exploratory analysis is a spectrum of options capable of accomplishing 
a mission that can be prioritized based on assessment results. 
While Davis’s framework applies simplification methods to the complexity of 
military strategic planning, shifts a focus towards organizational outputs versus inputs, and 
centers analysis on semi-independent units of capability evaluated at the mission level, its 
implementation has been problematic. In Capabilities-Based Planning: How it is Intended 
to Work and Challenges to its Successful Implementation, Colonel Stephen K. Walker 
observes that in 2005, DoD-wide integration of CBP had suffered from a lack of a common 
                                                 
50 Davis, xii. 
51 Davis, 25–26. 
52 Davis, 28. 
53 Davis, 28–30. 
54 Davis, 30–38. 
55 Davis, 30–38. 
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analytic schema which included a master set of scenarios and standardized means of 
collection and representing unit performance data.56 Walker also notes that the 
methodology was not fully embedded within all defense-planning organizations and that 
the strategic conclusions and methodology yielded from CBP were not cross-walked 
through budgetary plans and other fiscal documents, which generated criticism from the 
GAO.57 The DoD has since developed a universal joint task list (UJTL), which contains all 
necessary capabilities to inform strategic planning in all military branches.58 The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also adopted a domestic universal task list 
(UTL), which was meant to compliment FEMA’s national planning scenarios, between 
2003 and 2005, to implement elements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
(HSPD-8), eventually supplanted by PPD-8.59 DHS’ UTL has now been adapted into the 
National Preparedness Goal’s core capabilities. 
In the Technical Cooperation Program Joint Systems and Analysis Group’s Guide 
to Capability Based Planning, highlighted implementation challenges include the related 
issues working in high degrees of abstraction, the need to develop new analytical tools and 
competencies, and that setting and measuring capability goals is inherently difficult to 
initially structure.60 Davis recognizes these related challenges within his monograph 
stating, “the enthusiasm and focus needed to generate good ideas or to worry about 
problems creatively are enhanced when the scenario being considered is either real or 
obviously a relevant surrogate.”61 Implementing Capability Based Planning within the 
Public Safety and Security Sector: Lessons from the Defence Experience concurs with 
Davis on the importance of high fidelity scenarios as a starting place for CBP but notes 
                                                 
56 Stephen K. Walker, Capabilities-Based Planning: How it is Intended to Work and Challenges to its 
Successful Implementation (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 13, http://ssi.armywarcollege. 
edu/pdffiles/ksil239.pdf. 
57 Walker, 14–15. 
58 “Universal Joint Task List,” Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed September 26, 
2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL/. 
59 Sharon L. Caudle, “Homeland Security and Capabilities-Based Planning: Improving National 
Preparedness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 24–27. 
60 The Technical Cooperation Program, TTCP Technical Report, 5–6. 
61 Davis, Analytic Architecture, 9. 
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difficulty in coordinating the disparate stakeholders that comprise domestic local 
practitioners in strategic analysis stating, “Real coordination—that called for by non-
routine situations—tends to take place under the pressure of circumstance, of 
overwhelming need in the face of demanding situations.”62 The authors go on to note that 
coordination for CBP is most effective when small groups of key stakeholders work 
together on discrete operations over set timeframes with explicit lines of authority.63  
C. RISK ASSESSMENT AND RANKING 
Research has yielded a variety of differing approaches to assessing risk, and 
significant academic work has been done in the area. One comprehensive review of DHS 
risk assessment is prominent in this area, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Approach to Risk Analysis, which reviews current models employed by DHS and identifies 
several process-based flaws. Specific issues include the application of natural hazard 
assessment methodologies, which rely on historical data, to adversarial evaluations where 
background data is often unavailable.64 The review cites that modeling intentional acts 
represents a functional and probabilistic interrelationship between variables of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences introduces a level of analytical complexity more suited to 
assessment through game theory and similar variants.65 Concluding remarks suggest DHS 
develop this analytical capability and state that the baseline data available for the 
assessment of terrorism risk is comprised of expert opinions, analytical models, and 
analogs drawn from previous real-world events. Adversarial action remains inherently 
difficult to model quantifiably, due to gaps in sources of data and the complex behavior of 
individual actors. This difficulty, combined with the desire to understand both strategic 
(jurisdictional) and tactical (facility-based) risk of attack has led to a multitude of models 
                                                 
62 Hales and Chouinard, Implementing Capability Based Planning, 41. 
63 Hales and Chouinard, 42. 
64 National Research Council, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk 
Analysis (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), 44–51. 
65 National Research Council, 46–47. 
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that work with differing measures and represent a variety of design priorities, such as 
outputs to inform prevention versus those for response.66  
At a strategic level, significant literature is available on variants of game theory 
models to assess adversarial risk. Jesus Rios et al. provides a summary of common models 
including defend-attack and defend-attack-defend, which primarily calculate probabilities 
of success in defense or attack based on knowledge of each other’s capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, and intentions.67 Complex mathematics, analysis, and causal trees are used 
to arrive at probabilistic outputs. However, Gerald Brown and Louis Anthony argue that 
probabilistic risk assessment for terrorism can yield misleading results, specifically those 
that result from general uncertainty and assumptions about the level of knowledge and 
rationality of the adversarial actor.68 Methods that attempt to quantify adversarial risk 
remain diverse and have not coalesced around a singular approach. 
The interrelationship of the consequences of multiple threats and hazards and the 
likelihood of cascading aftereffects creates further analytical difficulty when assessments 
are performed at any jurisdictional level. Prioritization of one threat or hazard increases in 
complexity as a bombing can also cause a prolonged utility outage. A review of these 
complex interrelations concludes that joint hazard assessment is inherently difficult and 
must rely on a variety of quantitative and qualitative approaches, which most importantly 
must be structured based upon a set of desired outputs.69  
That a desired output must be used as a choice to scope how an assessment is 
conducted or abstracted raises issues of who is making that determination and whether 
inherited or promulgated methodologies are appropriate for varied jurisdictions to use, 
rather than developing local tools. A study of utilization of risk management by 
                                                 
66 Kyungryun Cathy Pak and Lynne Genik, Risk Assessment References: Documented Literature 
Search (New Delhi, India: Defence Research and Development, 2012), 163.  
67 Jesus Rios and David Rios Insua, “Adversarial Risk Analysis for Counterterrorism Modeling,” Risk 
Analysis 32, no. 5 (December 2011): 894–901, https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01713.x.  
68 Gerald G. Brown and Louis Anthony Tony Cox Jr., “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can 
Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts,” Risk Analysis 31, no. 2 (September 2010): 196–198, https://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01492.x.  
69 Melanie S. Kappes et al., “Challenges of Analyzing Multi-Hazard Risk: A Review,” Natural 
Hazards 64, no. 2 (July 2012): 1926–1929, https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11069-012-0294-2.  
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jurisdictions indicated that a majority of responding governments use internally developed 
non-formulaic tools, not DHS or FEMA-promulgated methodologies.70 Further, the 
majority of jurisdictions view risk assessment as a means of securing funding and updates 
to these processes are done infrequently.71 Where federal risk methodologies were used, 
jurisdictions recommended that assessment methodologies become more accessible to end-
users and less of an academic exercise.72  
Qualitative approaches to assessing and ranking risks that have been used widely 
include cross-disciplinary expert opinion elicitation to support the THIRA and 
jurisdictional natural hazard mitigation plan processes.73 These approaches produce fact 
sheets on the likelihood, vulnerability, and consequences of each threat and hazard and use 
facilitated discussion to prioritize incidents of greatest jurisdictional concern. An example 
is the deliberative risk ranking method (DRRM.)  
DRRM is a process that includes the participation of a diverse group of 
stakeholders. It uses facilitation to overcome and address organizational and personal 
biases that affect the perceived likelihood of a variety of risks by presenting threats and 
hazards as a function of their relative attributes, or consequences and frequency.74 DRRM 
as an analytical process has been validated by a large sample of risk managers and has been 
used by many to provide additional insights on how to increase the utility of results from 
the decision-making process.75 Irving Susel et al. added additional functionality to the 
outputs of DRRM and proposed an additional process step where the ordinal ranking of 
threats and hazards is converted to a ratio, which allows the comparative magnitude of a 
                                                 
70 An et al., Integrated Risk Management at the Local Level, 16–18. 
71 An et al., 16–18. 
72 An et al., 16–18. 
73 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Local Mitigation Planning Handbook (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 5-9, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1910-
25045-9160/fema_local_mitigation_handbook.pdf.  
74 Russell Lundberg and Henry H. Willis, “Deliberative Risk Ranking to Inform Homeland Security 
Strategic Planning,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 13, no. 1 (January 2016): 
7–15, https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2015-0065. 
75 Kara M. Morgan et al., “A Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks (II): Evaluation of Validity and 
Agreement among Risk Managers,” Risk Analysis 21, no. 5 (October 2001): 934–936, https://dx.doi.org/ 
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risk to be expressed.76 While DRRM has been demonstrated to support the evaluation of 
homeland security threats, the application of this method based upon this review remains 
strategic (jurisdictional) in nature.77 
D. OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND DECISION SUPPORT TOOLS 
The risk assessment methods previously reviewed focus on an evaluation of 
jurisdictional threats to inform a variety of courses of action, and as such, represent 
strategic approaches to evaluating decisions. Outside the narrow context of evaluating 
homeland security threats, the field of Operations Research (OR) empirically studies the 
processes that drive both strategic and tactical decision-making.78 Most importantly, 
variants of OR exist in a spectrum, which ranges from complex decision-support 
algorithms to constructions designed to yield insight from expert elicitation specific to a 
certain scenario.79 OR has been applied throughout DHS, and further research 
opportunities for additional expansion into areas of emergent threats remain, such as cyber 
security.80 
Salvatore Belardo and John Harrald, who researched a framework for applying OR 
decision support methodologies during catastrophic incidents, concluded: 
The infrequent occurrence and potentially catastrophic impacts of rare 
natural and technological disasters almost ensure that preplanning will be 
based on incomplete knowledge and that the response will be managed by 
unprepared and inadequately supported stranger groups. In planning and 
organizing for catastrophes the various constituents must engage in a 
uniquely divergent planning process. The process must encourage the 
                                                 
76 Irving Susel et al., “Augmenting the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks,” Risk Analysis 36, no. 
1 (July 2015): 49–52, https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/risa.12456.  
77 Russell Lundberg, “Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk Ranking 
Methodology” (PhD diss., Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2013), 55–59, http://www.rand.org/content/ 
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78 Richard C. Larson, “Decision Models for Emergency Response Planning,” in The McGraw-Hill 
Handbook of Homeland Security, ed. David Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 911–913.  
79 Larson, 911–913. 
80 Daniel P. Wright, Matthew J. Liberatore, and Robert L. Nydick, “A Survey of Operations Research 
Models and Applications in Homeland Security,” Interfaces 36, no. 6 (December 2006): 523–525. https:// 
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generation of the multiple perspectives so essential to understanding and 
describing problems in complex decision settings.81 
Stranger groups refer to the assemblage of a cross-disciplinary group of 
stakeholders, comprised of public safety representatives, government leadership and 
private sector partners, and specifically convened to address a potential or real-world 
incident. Collaboration then, among a group of varied participants, is an essential element 
to the success of collaborative decision-making and a means to combat issues of an 
organizational lack of preparation for, or complete knowledge of, how to address an 
incident.82 While it is acknowledged that collaboration among organizations in a disaster 
scenario is an imperative, decision making for a specific department or discipline in this 
environment usually rests with one person, or an authorized representative individual 
interacting with others.83 Recommendations to enhance group decision-making focus on 
the development of structured, replicable processes, known as decision support systems.84  
Decision support systems (DSS) represent structured processes to deliver near-real-
time information, or flows of knowledge, to enhance individual and facilitated group 
decision-making that otherwise would entirely draw from intuition.85 Technological 
approaches to DSS offer the means to aggregate information across a variety of existing 
sources with some standardization, such as organization of information by FEMA’s 
emergency support functions (ESFs,) but broad organizational frameworks may not be 
adaptable for a specific incident scenario.86 Each disaster is inherently unique and occurs 
                                                 
81 Salvatore Belardo and John Harrald, “A Framework for the Application of Group Decision Support 
Systems to the Problem of Planning for Catastrophic Events,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
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with decision-making, factors such as uncertainty, time-pressure, and complex 
interdependent lines of activity.87 Identifying DSSs and tools to inform decision makers 
during in-progress emergencies presents a challenge, since an emergency represents an 
unstructured problem for which accurate or probabilistic models cannot be promptly 
established.88 In the context of planning a mass gathering, structuring the problem may 
require the integration of a variety of approaches including Bayesian analysis, a statistical 
inference approach able to integrate both stakeholder subjective opinions and quantitative 
data into a probabilistic model that can be refined as opinions change over time, as 
informed by new data.89  
OR mathematic modeling of emergency and crisis decision-making has been done 
through the construction of generic, scenario-driven information flows and decision points 
that represent functional characteristics of response.90 Determining the severity of an 
emergency and resourcing the appropriate response can then be addressed through 
computer simulation and evaluation.91  
“Factors Influencing the Selection of Decision Support Systems for Emergency 
Management” provides data on the current level of adoption of DSSs by type and size of 
government, and in what functional areas those tools are used. Within the planning and 
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preparedness mission area, the survey indicated some of the lowest levels of adoption.92 
Importantly, the authors note that survey respondents overwhelmingly did not use DSS 
tools for planning purposes.93 In examining these results, the authors cite Turoff et al., who 
states, “An emergency system that is not used on a regular basis before an emergency will 
never be of use in an actual emergency.”94 The article also outlines the general process and 
supporting literature for scoping such tools and determining user requirements, such as 
outreach to stakeholders for discipline-specific analytical needs or success criteria prior to 
development.  
A notable subset of OR and related DSS design is the multiple-criteria decision-
making (MCDM) methodology, a structured process in which multiple decision makers 
evaluate selected evaluation criteria relevant to a problem (level of acceptable flooding, for 
example) and apply them to evaluate potential courses of action. Criteria weights can be 
collaboratively or mathematically determined, such as prioritizing life-saving actions over 
property protection and used to evaluate various courses of action. The final group 
consensus is represented as a mathematical aggregation of each alternative course of action 
by score.95 MCDM criteria are established through problem structuring, which as stated 
earlier, is predisposed to be more achievable for advanced notice or simulated events than 
unpredictable disasters. Weighting for a model and its criteria can be constructed by 
collecting the institutional preferences of key stakeholders through a process called 
preference elicitation.96  
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In summary, institutional preferences, such as maintaining safe crowd sizes at 
events, can be weighted to represent, for example, a police department’s focus on safety of 
attendees. The benefits of MCDM include a high degree of involvement and transparency 
in the decision-making experience and the graphic representation and identification of 
factors that strongly influence decision making.97 In addressing advanced notice event 
preplanning, the real-time on-line decision support system (RODOS) MCDM process 
designed for nuclear energy crises in Europe was able to utilize this group consensus tool 
to identify applicable courses of action based upon varied scenario inputs.98 This utilization 
has applicability for further research on tactical DSS tools for special event planning use 
at the jurisdictional level. 
E. COLLABORATION WITHIN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Research on the emerging collaboration-enabling role of emergency management 
practitioners is extensive. The complexity and frequency of serious emergency incidents 
and special events require agile horizontal and collaboration across many different 
disciplines and the concept of network governance in public safety has been described in 
recent research.99 Network governance is a term characterized by semi-formal 
collaborative structures that operate outside normal, organizationally focused (vertical) 
bureaucratic systems.100 A study of the incident command structure (a vertical hierarchy) 
compared with the ESF framework (a close-functioning horizontal arrangement) found 
greater degrees of collaborative performance in the ESF environment based on 
betweenness centrality from social network analysis.101 
                                                 
97 Bertsch et al., 114–119. 
98 Bertsch et al., 127–128. 
99 Alireza Abbasi and Naim Kapucu, “Structural Dynamics of Organizations during the Evolution of 
Interorganizational Networks in Disaster Response,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 9, no. 1 (January 2012): 3–5, https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1547-7355.1975.  
100 Keith G. Provan and Patrick Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and 
Effectiveness,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, no. 2 (June 2007): 230–235, 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum015.  
101 Naim Kapucu and Vener Garayev, “Structure and Network Performance: Horizontal and Vertical 
Networks in Emergency Management,” Administration & Society 48, no. 8 (July 2014): 946–947. https:// 
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095399714541270.  
 24 
The uncertainty found within disaster environments requires that emergency 
managers adapt to dynamic situations, and William Waugh and Gregory Streib argue 
success emerges from the ability to manage interagency mission interdependencies and 
overlaps effectively.102 The effectiveness of an emergency management program is largely 
based on this skill set instead of technical knowledge.103 The discipline of emergency 
management, due to its primary interagency mission space, and hyper-focus on addressing 
disaster consequence severity, is often identified as the primary facilitator for large-scale 
interagency collaboration.104 Despite this facilitating role, collaborative difficulties 
between departments can lead to weak planning products.105  
Susan Page Hocevar’s survey of homeland security enterprise (HSE) government 
organizations identified a variety of factors for success and barriers that characterize 
interagency collaborative efforts. Examples of barriers include a lack of well-defined roles 
and procedures for establishing collaboration, inadequate communication, and divergent 
goals. Success factors include an appreciation of others’ perspectives, recognition of the 
need for collaboration, and a sharing of common goals or recognized interdependence.106 
The study recommends that lateral mechanisms be developed and formalized to support 
interagency information and resource exchanges.107 Hocevar’s work is built upon Jardine, 
who argues that incentives, such as continuing or new funding opportunities are greater 
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motivating factors for collaboration than a shared-goal perspective among different 
parties.108  
F. CONCLUSION 
From a review of the literature, a research opportunity exists for further exploring 
how structured decision-making processes using CBP and the field’s subset of 
methodologies in concert with the THIRA may enhance collaborative planning capability. 
Further, it has been identified that inculcating these practices into normal operational 
environments, such as special events, may yield collaboration efficiencies in disasters and 
greater competency in conducting CBP. 
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III. THE THIRA’S COMPOSITIONAL ELEMENTS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 
This chapter explores the underlying frameworks that comprise the FEMA THIRA 
process and argue the origins of this methodology have strong analogous ties to defense 
CBP. Finally, this chapter concludes with a hybrid THIRA approach that can be adapted 
from a jurisdictional strategic risk assessment to a special event-planning methodology. 
A. COMPARISON OF CBP AND THIRA PROCESS FRAMEWORK 
As stated in Chapter II, CBP is used by the DoD, which began experimentation 
with non-linear planning models in the early 1960s.109 Characterized as planning under 
uncertainty within budgetary constraints where trade-offs must be assessed and defended, 
CBP focuses on identifying future needs to meet a wide array of possible challenges.110  
In 2003, RAND developed the monograph, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-
Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation for the Secretary of 
Defense. Largely presented as a document to help facilitate substantial institutional change 
in approaching strategic planning, its author Paul Davis included the following process 
model (Figure 1) within the monograph’s executive summary.  
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Figure 1. Davis CBP Analytical Framework111 
In Figure 1, the “identify plausible worries” phase includes the wide range of 
possible threats that may necessitate some form of military action. Within the second 
module, the “develop design space” adds context to the either generic or specific “plausible 
worries” to constitute name-level scenarios. In this phase, a simple plausible worry of a 
North Korean invasion of South Korea would have supporting details added to inject 
realism to the event, such as the invasion force strength, speed of advancement, status of 
defending resources, etc. The added context to these name-level scenarios allows needed 
capabilities to be assessed.112 The next phase, “decide goals” establishes metrics of 
performance for the developed capabilities, such a time-performance for specific units to 
accomplish certain objectives. Within “develop capability options,” identified needs are 
considered in the context of established metrics to create targets of capability. Throughout 
the rest of the process, analytical processes are conducted at multiple levels of command 
                                                 
111 Source: Davis, Analytic Architecture, 12. 
112 Davis, 21–23. 
 29 
to identify what capabilities should be prioritized within budgetary and time constraints, as 
well as where capability overlaps occur that may indicate gained efficiencies.113 
FEMA’s implementation of PPD-8 included a list of 32 core capabilities derived 
from an earlier version of the targeted capability list (TCL), which was developed from the 
DoD UTL.114 The current FEMA core capability list follows in Figure 2.115 
 
Figure 2. FEMA Core Capability List116 
In addition to in-person technical assistance provided by regional FEMA offices, 
Comprehensive Planning Guide 201 (CPG-201) was issued for stakeholders as the 
doctrinal guidance for completing a THIRA. Within it, as seen in Figure 3, the document 
presents the following process chart and narrative descriptions to planners. 
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Figure 3. The THIRA Process117 
Figure 3 is summarized by FEMA as: 
1. Identify the Threats and Hazards of Concern. Based on a combination of 
experience, forecasting, subject matter expertise, and other available 
resources, identify a list of the threats and hazards of primary concern to the 
community.  
2. Give the Threats and Hazards Context. Describe the threats and hazards 
of concern, showing how they may affect the community.  
3. Establish Capability Targets. Assess each threat and hazard in context to 
develop a specific capability target for each core capability identified in the 
National Preparedness Goal. The capability target defines success for the 
capability.  
4. Apply the Results. For each core capability, estimate the resources 
required to achieve the capability targets using community assets and 
mutual aid, while also considering preparedness activities, including 
mitigation opportunities.118 
Part three of the THIRA process demonstrates the outputs-focused, methodological 
CBP approach: develop capability targets from the worst outcome of the scenarios of 
concern combined with the levels of performance established for each FEMA core 
capability. Figure 4 illustrates this process.  
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Figure 4. Example of Developing Capability Targets119 
Step four of the THIRA was previously a multidisciplinary stakeholder process of 
identifying what NIMS-typed and non-typed (i.e., jurisdiction-specific) resources and 
personnel would be required to meet the capability target. While 2018 FEMA THIRA/SPR 
guidance has eliminated the original step four from updated guidance, the implicit goals of 
step four have been shifted to SPR step 2, “assess capability.” In part two of the SPR 
process, jurisdictions indicate what the gap is between the established capability target and 
what they estimate the current capability to be. FEMA guidance then requires jurisdictions 
to identify what corrective actions to undertake to minimize the gap.  
Table 1 provides a process-step comparison between the Davis DoD CBP process 
and the FEMA THIRA process maps. While the Davis CBP model does not have 
numerically identified “steps,” elements that shared similar or related processes have been 
grouped together. The rightmost column assesses whether analogous or congruent 
practices from the CBP model can be identified within the THIRA process. Qualitative 
descriptors are applied that range from “very similar” to “similar” and finally to “no 
analogous step” and reflect levels of related, if not congruent, evaluative practices between 
DoD and FEMA approaches. 
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Table 1. Comparison of DoD CBP and FEMA THIRA Process Steps 
Process 
Step Davis DoD CBP  FEMA THIRA
120 THIRA’s Analogous Tie to CBP process 
Step 1 Identify plausible worries 
Identify threats and 
hazards of concern Very similar 
Step 2 Name-level scenarios/develop design space 
Give threats and hazards 
context Very similar 
Step 3 Develop goals/develop capability options 
Establish capability 
targets Very similar 
Step 4 Assess options Apply the results/Assess current capability Similar 
Step 5 Analytical assessment under uncertainty 
Identify and mitigate 
gaps No congruency 
Step 6 
Choose and develop 
needed capability 
options 
Assess the impact of 
funds No congruency  
 
Table 1’s analysis indicates that steps one through four of the THIRA have notable 
congruency with the process of the CBP objective for each step’s centers of gravity. The 
FEMA THIRA process diverges from Davis’ CBP framework at step five: conducting 
analytical assessments under uncertainty for a variety of capability options to achieve set 
outcomes. 
B. APPLICATION WITHIN SPECIAL EVENT PLANNING 
While the THIRA is intended to be a strategic planning process to inform 
jurisdictional homeland security preparedness, the following section argues that special 
events offer an analogous interdisciplinary planning environment to that of disaster 
planning where the THIRA can be applied.  
In support of initial planning actions, planning guidance from federal agencies 
identifies options for consideration of interdisciplinary deliberative discussions. At the end 
of the planning cycle, the national doctrine provides a framework for summarizing 
operational and resource level definitions into a common command and control framework 
through the completion of an incident action plan, which is a series of standardized 
documents that form the foundation of the ICS.  
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Functionally, special events contain planning and operational elements that occupy 
the spectrum of FEMA’s five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery.121 For example, public messaging about hydrating for extreme heat outdoors 
equates to prevention activity, deploying garbage trucks as blocking vehicles equates to 
protection, alcohol sale-curtailment policies informed influenced by festival emergency 
medical services (EMS) contact numbers is mitigation, remotely-staged surge ambulances 
approximates response, and street sweepers and crowd control post-event are recovery. 
These assumptions and correlations are reasonable for mission areas related to actions 
supporting a notional 4th of July celebration. The scale and scope of the capabilities 
delivered in the context of a disaster in lieu of these approximations can vary greatly but 
are in both cases developed through a similar interagency planning process.  
Special events require the deployment of personnel and resources performing 
missions analogous to many of FEMA’s 32 core capabilities performed in a real-world 
environment. Medical tents, patient tracking systems, and surge ambulances at an event 
align with the public health, healthcare, and EMS core capability’s definition, “Provide 
lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services,” albeit at a smaller scale.122 
This alignment can provide opportunities to test plans and developed functions for a 
disaster within the context of a planned, real-world event.  
The actions associated with special event and disaster-planning processes are also 
similar. FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG-101) defines emergency 
operations plans (EOPs) as the core foundational document from which tactical hazard- 
and function-based plans are constructed.123 A core element of EOPs is the situational 
assessment, which is comprised of a threat and hazard assessment, a review of current  
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capability, and an overview of mitigation actions to reduce the identified risks.124 Hazard-
based plans are commonly constructed in a similar format: A situational assessment; risk 
assessment of the hazard; consequence analysis; capability review; roles and 
responsibilities in enacting the plan; current resources and other lines of support; and, 
implementation actions.125 In addition to the aforementioned process, threat must be 
carefully considered. 
Special events are also adversarial targets, which require jurisdictions to assess risk 
and determine steady-state public safety services and contingency plans in the event of an 
accident, attack, or other occurrence.126 These contingency plans can be derived from 
existing hazard and function-based interagency plans, as well as departmental standard 
operating procedures and include both considerations for scalability and mutual aid.127 
In general, disaster plans cover the full scope of a hazard- or threat-related incident, 
from notification to response, scaling-up of resources, coordinating with incident command 
posts and command centers, and recovery actions. In comparison, special event planning 
commonly begins around the parameters of an event, reviewing potential threats and 
hazards, assigning personnel and responses to mitigate risk, ascribing roles and 
responsibilities, establishing lines of command and coordination, and developing an 
incident-specific policy.128 
Both disaster response and special event planning use the same NIMS framework. 
Within NIMS, the coordinating mechanism for structuring interagency planning is 
the incident action plan (IAP). The IAP “is a written plan that defines the incident 
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objectives and reflects the tactics necessary to manage an incident during an operational 
period.”129 Arguably, the context of a disaster scenario can be substituted with that of a 
planned event. The important characteristic of developing an IAP for both a disaster and 
planned event is that it is a facilitated interagency planning process, which inherently 
requires collaboration.130 
Planning for potential disasters and approaching special events does include 
differences in variables, specifically the types of participating partners and perceptions of 
necessity and urgency. Planning for a disaster is largely an abstract exercise compared with 
that undertaken for special events. For disasters, a risk assessment denotes a need to 
develop a response and recovery function, at a minimum, around a possible incident. 
Special event interagency planning, in contrast, attracts command staff and tactical staff, 
as well as leadership due to the high-visibility of produced events, the likelihood that 
incidents can occur, and the live media coverage often present. From these factors, a group-
wide perceived incentive occurs “to get it right,” which can be characterized as a felt-need 
to participate in reaching a solution, and the recognition of working towards a common 
goal with the involvement and support of leaders.131 The components within this group 
incentive have been identified as success factors in positively affecting interagency 
collaboration.132  
As previously discussed, both disaster and special event planning share many of 
the same planning objectives, frameworks, and stakeholders, and employ the same core 
capabilities sought in both planned and unplanned events, but differ only in scale. Special 
events differ from disaster planning in that processes contain higher-level stakeholders who 
can facilitate conflict resolution and ensure agency commitment. These stakeholders are 
focused on firm deadlines and difficult problems that provide intrinsic motivation for 
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resolution. In other words, special events may offer frequent opportunities to engage in 
more effective interagency collaboration in comparison to disaster planning.  
In contrast, standardized FEMA approaches for assessing risk and needed resources 
do not exist. In the absence of a decision support system, planning participants can 
encounter sociological and organizational issues that can negatively impact planning 
outcomes. These issues include cognitive biases, a lack of full departmental commitment 
to the mission, and low-seniority stakeholders not escalating policy decisions to those in 
command.133  
As this section has outlined, special event planning closely mirrors that of 
jurisdictional disaster planning: planning guidance, such as FEMA doctrinal guides and the 
ICS are frequently applied and scaled-down to fit the application environment.  
C. APPLYING THE THIRA: A HYBRID FRAMEWORK 
This section argues that a special event can occupy the mission-system analysis 
space in lieu of an entire jurisdiction within the FEMA THIRA process. Step one, or DoD’s 
“plausible worries,” is substituted with event-specific threats and hazards, such as a stage 
collapse, improvised explosive device attack, etc., in the same manner the FEMA THIRA 
is concerned with category five hurricane scenarios. This substitution is also represented 
in tables, and a selection from FEMA’s 32 core capabilities (e.g., interdiction and 
disruption, mass care services, etc.) is adapted to reflect the operational goals of these 
capabilities within the context of a special event. From these examples, THIRA step three 
(establish capability targets) is simulated. This process yields capability targets specific to 
the event that demonstrate the THIRA can be effectively “scaled down” to provide outputs 
to support special event planning. This framework is established in a six-step sequence, 
analogous to both Davis’ and FEMA’s methodologies for CBP and THIRA. It further 
argues that the adaptions are based on process similarity between the two approaches in 
the context of special event planning doctrine. 
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1. Step One: Assess Threats and Hazards 
The THIRA has several inputs: threats and hazards; the consequences calculated 
from that list; the desired jurisdictional outcomes; and the simplified actions needed to 
reach those outcomes (core capabilities). A local group of stakeholders can first develop a 
scaled version of the national planning scenarios by using the DDRM methodology to 
identify and rank the significance of each type of event. Step one of the FEMA CPG-201 
document instructs state and local planners to “consult a number of sources to identify 
threats and hazards during the THIRA process.”134 The document provides a list of 
common sources of threat information available to local jurisdictions, such as data from 
natural hazard mitigation plans and urban area fusion centers. THIRA guidance also 
stresses the participation of the “whole community” in this process for threat and hazard 
selection, a term that includes not only those in public service but also includes critical 
infrastructure owners, as well as academic institutions.135 Bringing a large, 
multidisciplinary group into a structured planning environment represents a challenge for 
facilitation. Strong opinions and biases may be present and reaching consensus on a set of 
selected threats and hazards can be difficult. The deliberative risk ranking methodology 
(DRRM), described within chapter two, can provide a structured basis for expedient group 
facilitation to accomplish this task.  
Previously summarized in Chapter II, this section will expand further on the DRRM 
process. DRRM is a qualitative group consensus-reaching methodology well suited for 
local interagency collaborative environments, due to the focus on facilitated discussion. 
This facilitation is applied to overcome and address organizational and personal cognitive 
and judgmental biases in the perception of likelihood for a variety of risks by presenting 
threats and hazards as a function of their relative attributes, or consequences and frequency 
of occurrence.136 The process is initially conducted by providing participants with threat 
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and hazard briefing dossiers that allows for individual risk prioritization. A follow-on 
discussion provides a forum to review the aggregation of risk priorities and the DRRM 
proctor structures discussion around the reasoning used to determine why higher-
prioritized threats have been scored as such and why others have been relegated to lower 
areas of concern. Following this discussion, individuals again re-prioritize threats and 
hazards of concern, the exercise is again aggregated, and the resulting group consensus is 
presented at the process conclusion. DRRM has been shown to demonstrate favorable 
decision transparency and studies of group participants have indicated significant levels of 
satisfaction with process outcomes.137  
A notional example of this exercise is in Table 2, which demonstrates how 
scenarios can be scaled down from a list of jurisdictional-level events to events that can 
negatively impact a special event. The criteria for special event scenario selection utilize 
the heuristic defined within CPG-201 that states that selections should overwhelm current 
capability or stress local public safety personnel and assets.138  
Table 2. THIRA Step 1 Comparison 
CBP/THIRA Step 1: Identify threats and hazards of concern 
Jurisdiction THIRA STEP 1139 Special Event THIRA 
Step 1 
Category 3 Hurricane Severe weather event 
Hazmat-carrying train derailment Vehicle ramming attack  
Bridge collapse Stage collapse 
Complex coordinated terrorist attack 
(CCTA) with active shooter and 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
device (VBIED) attacks 
CCTA with active shooter 
and VBIED attacks on 
assembled crowd of 
patrons 
Civil unrest Crowd stampede  
 
                                                 
137 Lundberg, and Willis, 25. 
138 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 12–14. 
139 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3rd ed., 12–14. 
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Complementing this established list from step one, planners then should map each 
core capability to the scenario that presents the greatest challenge to delivering that 
capability in a crisis.140 For example, each of the listed scenarios generates fatalities but 
group deliberation can conclude that performing the fatality management core capability 
in the context of a stage collapse is the most difficult, given the potential need of removing 
structural debris first or stabilizing the scene. FEMA provides a notional mapping within 
CPG-201, which is followed by a notional example for a special event, as shown in Figure 
5 and Table 3. 
 




                                                 
140 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3rd ed., 13. 
141 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3rd ed., 12–14. 
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Table 3. Core Capabilities to Scenario Mapping 
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This mapping of stressed core capabilities to each scenario is accomplished through 
interdisciplinary discussion and subject matter expert judgment, both predominantly 
qualitative processes that draw on tacit knowledge.  
2. Step Two: Give the Threats and Hazards Context 
For the second step of the THIRA process, the special event threats and hazards 
defined within step one are given context by creating detailed scenarios to arrive at 
standardized metrics for consequences, which can be applied from the THIRA 
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methodology, or defined by participants. An example of standardized metrics from the 
THIRA methodology follows in Table 4.  
Table 4. Translating Jurisdictional Metrics to Special Events 
CBP/THIRA Step 2a 
FEMA Standardized impact language142 Special event Standardized impact language 
Number of fatalities  Number of fatalities 
Number of people requiring medical care Number of people requiring medical care 
Number of people requiring rescue Number of people requiring rescue 
Number of people requiring evacuation Number of people requiring evacuation 
Number of structure fires Number of fires within event footprint  
 
In most cases, existing THIRA impact metrics can be carried over directly into the 
special event context, whereas some require adaptation. Davis argues that to identify basic 
capabilities and their associated metrics, planners must simplify each scenario to identify 
the generic operational challenges that make up each. An example of such simplification 
may be reducing the phrase “losing cell phone service due to a stampede where afterwards 
survivors overload circuits trying to reunify with loved ones” to “public safety loses 
cellular communication for voice and data.”143 Selecting a wide set of threat and hazard 
scenarios is necessary to ensure that all areas of capability, such as operational 
communications, are influenced by the calculated impacts from step two of the THIRA. 
Similarly, the process can work in reverse; by using the existing impact categories defined 
by FEMA, special event planners can work backward using cognitive modeling or 
simulation to identify the likely scenarios that can cause them. Davis’s focus on 
comprehensive decomposition of scenarios to ensure they stress all capability areas is a 
primary departure from DoD scenario-specific planning due to the potential for only some 
                                                 
142 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3rd ed., 18. 
143 Davis, Analytic Architecture, 23–25. 
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of the capabilities to be stressed, while over-estimated conclusions are made about 
others.144 FEMA THIRA guidance also recommends selecting threats and hazards that  
most stress each core capability. 145 Once a sufficiently large enough array of threats and 
hazards has been selected, constructed into detailed scenarios, scenarios modeled to  
yield consequences, and the scenarios decomposed into generic capabilities, target setting 
can occur.  
3. Step Three: Construct Capability Targets 
FEMA’s 2018 THIRA guidance states that planning stakeholders then construct 
capability targets by using jurisdictional preference to determine both a timeframe metric 
and the specific amount of consequence that the jurisdiction believes should be addressed 
within it, if not the maximum consequence. An example of a FEMA-defined capability 
target for fatality management is: 
Within [# timeframe] of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, 
and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for [# 
quantity] fatalities.146 
By identifying a time frame metric and the level of consequence, the planning 
jurisdiction can set targets to build capability and capacity over time through investments 
in preparedness.147 Setting performance targets in this way, absent scenario context, aligns 
with Davis’s definition of CBP, which is a planning process focused on desired outcomes 
and how best to achieve them.148 FEMA recommends to planners that targets should reflect 
a community’s unique planning and investment strategies, which connects planning for 
future capacity to a local economic framework that requires balancing levels of risk against 
                                                 
144 Davis, 23–25. 
145 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 12. 
146 This example is drawn from FEMA’s 2018 THIRA uniform reporting tool (URT).  
147 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 7-9. 
148 The Technical Cooperation Program, TTCP Technical Report, 2. 
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tradeoffs.149 These tradeoffs are also not entirely influenced monetarily, as Davis states 
that a logical order exists to how even generic tasks unfold and sequence with one another 
that can allow for timeframe metrics to be extrapolated.150 In the context of a terrorist 
attack, fatality management cannot begin until the scene is secured by law enforcement. 
Similarly, specific capabilities have best practices in terms of speed or rate of performance, 
irrespective of the context in which they must be performed, such as the Public Alert and 
Warning core capability, which focuses on the ability to disseminate timely and actionable 
emergency information to the public.151 In applying these capability relationships, a special 
event capability target for Public Alert and Warning can be notionally constructed as: 
Within [15 minutes] notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable 
information to [95%] of people affected. 
Through substitution of incident context, the capability target can be applicable to 
a notice-event, like an encroaching lighting storm or describe a goal for messaging speed 
following a stage collapse. To complete step three, all special event core capability targets 
should be adapted from the FEMA methodology to the mass gathering planning process.  
4. Step Four: Assess Options/Assess Capability 
FEMA’s THIRA step four determines a jurisdiction’s current level of performance 
respective to each core capability target. In this process, the objective is to obtain the 
baseline level of performance for each core capability to support a later gap analysis.152 
Davis states that each core capability should be assessed independent of others, or 
measured within its own domain, despite the tendency of similar core capabilities to have 
natural overlaps.153 For Davis, this constraint is meant to encourage robust capabilities that 
can operate with a degree of independence or in a self-sustaining manner. Enlisting an 
                                                 
149 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 22. 
150 Davis, Analytic Architecture, 51. 
151 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.”  
152 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 23–28. 
153 Davis, Analytic Architecture, 37. 
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example, he notionally describes the full capability of a joint-strike fighter as being a 
function of the aircraft but also its ground support-team, refueling ability, and joint 
operations planning, training, and exercising.154 Through this example, Davis defines the 
term capability envelope, or the specific combination of equipment, personnel, training, 
exercising, and planning required to accomplish a specific task within a set time frame. 
This capability composition is analogous to FEMA’s planning, organization, equipment, 
training, exercises (POETE) elements, which describe the five areas of activity through 
which a capability can be developed: planning, organizing, equipping, training, and 
exercising.155 Applied to the context of the previously defined capability target, the 
assessment framework becomes:  
What combination of equipment, planning, training, exercising and 
organizing will allow the jurisdiction to deliver actionable information to 
95% of the people affected within 15 minutes? 
In some cases, capability envelopes may already exist: joint hazard assessment 
teams (JHATs) and EMS taskforces for special events typically include members from 
different disciplines, operate under joint concept of operations (CONOPS), have logistics 
and supply chains, and have specialized command and control elements.156 Additionally, 
these capability envelopes can be assessed by simplistic metrics, such as the average 
perimeter that can be patrolled effectively by one JHAT or the number of crowd extractions 
an EMS task force can make in a period of time, on average. Acknowledging that 
jurisdictions may not readily have a catalog of assets or an understanding of 
interdependencies, initial capability envelopes are inherently constructed by conducting 
the capability target assessment framework. Despite this simplification, it is possible that 
performance measurement can only fully be possible over time as real-world events are 
benchmarked. Davis provides syntax for this process stating, “Who does what, in pursuit 
                                                 
154 Davis, 10–11. 
155 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA), 3rd ed., 6. 
156 Dan Kaszeta, CBRN and Hazmat Incidents At Major Public Events (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 
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of what goals, according to what concept, using what assets?”157 Understanding the 
estimated metrics of performance and the assets, people, planning, and equipment 
comprising each capability envelope is necessary for operating effectively within 
budgetary constraints.158 
5. Step Five: Choose Options  
All protection and contingency planning for mass gatherings occurs within an 
economic framework that inherently requires assessing resource tradeoffs. Local budgets, 
grant funds, and event producer fees naturally determine a ceiling for the level of assets 
and personnel that can support a mass gathering, despite the level of assessed risk. With 
the focus of CBP on outputs, not asset inventories (inputs), the ability to assess potential 
tradeoffs can be enhanced. Participants with capability envelopes can instead seek more 
cost-effective types of capability enablers through lower hourly rate personnel or rented 
equipment alternatives, rather than negating the use of that capability due to cost 
limitations. Once tradeoffs are identified, all capability options can be documented in a 
single interagency plan or through an ICS IAP.159 
6. Step Six: Apply the Results and Measurement  
In this final step, local stakeholders determine initial metrics of performance that 
can be assessed during the mass gathering, specific to each type of capability being 
delivered. Collecting performance and effectiveness data for novel and annual events 
establishes a foundation for quantitative after-action reviews to inform future planning. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter assessed the similarity between Paul K. Davis’s CBP framework and 
FEMA’s THIRA methodology and found congruence, as well as options for THIRA 
improvement at the local level. Next, special event planning processes and interagency 
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dynamics were explored as a scale model for approximating jurisdiction-wide disaster 
planning. A THIRA special event planning framework was established containing the 
following steps: assess threats and risks; give them context; construct capability targets; 
assess options and capability; choose options; and apply the results and measurement. The 
next chapter constructs and explores several potential implementation scenarios for this 




IV. DESIGN OF POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
THIRA ENHANCEMENT 
This chapter describes the method of research used in this thesis, details identified 
policy options, and establishes the evaluation criteria to be applied in Chapter V. 
A. OVERVIEW AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY 
Policy options analysis is the method of research applied in this section, specifically 
the approach developed by Eugene Bardach in A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis: The 
Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving. The eight-part process consists of the 
following steps: define the problem; construct alternate solutions; select criteria for judging 
success; project outcomes; analyze trade-offs; evaluate options; select an option; and 
explain the best outcome.160  
The THIRA, as a mechanism of implementing PPD-8, is intended to define required 
levels of capability to constitute an appropriate degree of national preparedness.161 The 
focus of this research effort is to explore how this widely adopted approach can be 
augmented to provide more tactical, situation-specific preparedness insight to local 
jurisdictions, by applying it to special event planning. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS AND CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT 
Three policy options are presented to examine approaches to integrating the 
proposed THIRA framework into a special event multidisciplinary planning processes. 
These policy options represent enhancements to the THIRA process to inculcate CBP 
further into normal, frequent, and stakeholder-accessible planning methodologies. The 
options are listed and briefly summarized in this section before assessment criteria are 
identified. 
                                                 
160 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, 5th ed. 
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• Policy Option A: Do not integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a 
special event planning process at the local level; maintain the status quo. 
• Policy Option B: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a special 
event planning process at the local level. 
• Policy Option C: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a NSSE. 
These policy options are described in detail and potential outcomes explored within 
the following section.  
• Policy Option A: Do not integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a 
special event planning process at the local level; maintain the status quo. 
This policy option reflects no incorporation of the THIRA into special event 
planning. It assumes a locally planned special event for a notional 4th of July celebration 
with a pre-planning window of 90 days.162 
• Policy Option B: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a special 
event planning process at the local level. 
In this policy option, the THIRA is scaled down for use in special event planning 
to support initial event scoping, including threat and hazard assessment and resource 
estimation within the context of a local government effort. For the purposes of this policy 
option, a notional outdoor 4th of July festival of 250,000 attendees with a Level 2 DHS 
special event assessment rating (SEAR) is used as the evaluative scenario construct.163 A 
SEAR 2 rated event is selected for this policy option because the rating denotes a large-
scale mass gathering that requires substantial security and contingency planning. A level 2 
SEAR rating represents an event that DHS has concluded has major significance, notable 
                                                 
162 This time frame is an annual best practice for the City of Philadelphia and is drawn from the 
author’s experience. 
163 The DHS SEAR methodology ranks special events based on a non-public assessment process that 
considers the number and concentration of attendees, venue type, duration, dignitary attendance, perimeter 
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national or international relevance, and requires some level of federal support.164 Examples 
of other SEAR 2 rated events include the Boston Marathon, Kentucky Derby, and 
Washington, DC’s 4th of July celebrations.165 Under a SEAR 2 rating, the event remains 
locally managed and planning participants include public safety, security, and 
administrative stakeholders commonly found in smaller-scale local event planning.166  
• Policy Option C: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a NSSE. 
This option presents THIRA integration into the planning framework of a NSSE. 
NSSE’s are defined under Presidential Decision Directive 62 as “a designated event that, 
due to its political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of 
domestic/international criminal activity (terrorism) as a result of national significance and 
high visibility, requiring the lead of Secret Service.”167 NSSEs are less frequent than local 
government-managed occurrences but include large events, such as the Presidential 
Inauguration, political conventions, and some dignitary visits. A local government can 
request a NSSE designation once gubernatorial approval is secured, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security makes the final determination. Once designated a NSSE by the 
Secretary, the Secret Service is assigned as the protection and planning lead, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is assigned to counterterrorism planning, and FEMA leads 
contingency planning. It is important to note that during a NSSE, the local government 
plays a supporting role to the lead federal departments, who establish planning criteria, 
event security performance levels, and other desired outcomes. The NSSE framework is 
comprised of federal, state, and local stakeholders engaged in planning across many 
functional subcommittees, which address topics, such as venue protection and 
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165 Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative, Bay Area Large Special Events Planning Guide and 
CONOPS Template, 3-3–3-7. 
166 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Special Events Contingency Planning, 1-2–1-4.  
167 “Protection,” Secret Service, accessed October 23, 2018, https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/. 
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transportation.168 FEMA chairs planning efforts across several subcommittee topic areas 
including mass care, health and medical, and life safety that typically culminate in 
subcommittee CONOPS and IAPs for the event. This policy option examines the THIRA 
framework applied to the FEMA-led NSSE subcommittee planning process. 
C. SELECTION OF EVALUATION METRICS 
This section outlines the criteria used to assess the performance of each policy 
option, which have been drawn from CBP implementation literature and best practices for 
emergency management collaboration. Again, this thesis explores how inculcating 
elements of the THIRA into more frequent, locally focused special event planning activities 
can contribute to familiarity with CBP principles and subsequently greater use of the 
methodology.  
Chapter III explored the analogous doctrinal, procedural, and interdisciplinary 
stakeholder engagement elements of activity shared between planning for disasters and 
planning for mass gatherings. This exploration identified that conducting a THIRA CBP 
sequence can replace a traditional hazard-specific or all-hazard planning and mitigation 
sequence, which is conducted with interdisciplinary stakeholders. The chapter concluded 
with an adapted THIRA CBP framework drawn from FEMA’s focus on jurisdictional risk 
and preparedness evaluation, then scaled down to inform special event risk assessment and 
resourcing decision support. However, initial adoption and implementation of CBP by local 
jurisdictions relies on a variety of factors beyond methodological validation or planning 
process congruencies.  
• Top leader participation: Sharon Caudle asserts that senior level 
leadership participation is necessary for successful CBP implementation 
both through ownership of the jurisdiction’s CBP process and conducting 
executive-level decisions around which capability options should be 
developed based on mission-system analysis.169 This decision-making 
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function still inherently relies on imperfect analytical tools, but Paul Davis 
states that the assessment of CBP outputs “‘should combine hard analysis 
with judgment and with qualitative, value-laden tradeoffs across goals—
matters that are in the province of top decision makers.”170 In the context 
of local special event planning, top leader participation is defined as the 
direct engagement of executive-level public safety agency commanders, 
office and agency directors, and senior appointed executive branch 
officials in the CBP process. The length and frequency of CBP process 
engagement by top leadership is assessed by each policy option’s average 
event planning time horizon and common vertical reporting process. The 
metric assessment’s ordinal values include “low participation,” “medium 
participation,” and “high participation.”  
• Time for collaboration: Hocevar identified that interagency planning 
participants who possessed shared goals or objectives that operate within 
established frameworks positively contribute to collaboration.171 The TCP 
“Guide to Capabilities Based Planning” highlights that a top, initial 
requirement for CBP implementation is interagency collaboration, since 
each organization independently possesses the existing information, 
assets, staff, and authorities necessary for CBP.172 Further, Canada’s 
Centre for Security Science concludes that CBP is best practiced locally 
when key stakeholders work collaboratively on a discrete mission or 
objective with well-defined lines of authority.173 Despite a jurisdiction’s 
developed planning efficiencies, the novelty of applying a divergent CBP 
planning framework is initially less time-efficient than current methods. 
The Centre for Security Science concludes that the enhanced collaboration 
required by CBP comes with notable transactional costs, primarily 
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stakeholder participation time.174 Considering this temporal cost to 
collaboration for CBP, this metric assesses each policy option’s common 
planning time horizons by the ratings, “six or more months,” “three to six 
months,” and “less than three months.” 
• Partitioning: Another requirement for successful CBP implementation is 
full-mission scope coverage, defined within a domestic context as a CBP 
process inclusive of all required capabilities across the protection, 
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery FEMA missions.175 Davis 
clarifies that decompositions of threat and hazard scenarios should be 
inclusive of every unique operational challenge that may emerge to ensure 
comprehensive planning. Further, this decomposition should group similar 
elements together that contribute to the delivery of a capability within a 
capability envelope.176 Also referred to as partitioning, this grouping 
together of similar assets, personnel, and vehicles within a mission-system 
analysis allows for capability options and tradeoffs to be synthesized and 
assessed based on desired outcomes.177 This metric evaluates the policy 
option for opportunities within existing local and NSSE planning 
frameworks for similar or mission-aligned organizations to conduct 
mission-system analysis in functional or topical groups. This metric’s 
ordinal values are “high partitioning opportunities,” “moderate 
partitioning opportunities,” and “low partitioning opportunities.”  
• Integrating a CBP champion: Paul Davis’ monograph on a DoD CBP 
analytical architecture envisioned the end user of the process as a 
combatant commander, but no singular analog exists for local 
government’s public safety and emergency organizations. This scenario 
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complicates identifying a key decision maker or process leader for CBP at 
the local government level.178 CBP also employs variants of exploratory 
analysis, a divergent and holistic process of problem-structuring, and 
critical thinking for which the Center for Security Science recommends a 
form of orientation, or eased entry for new participants. This process 
mediation requires a champion to adapt CBP approaches to fit local 
expectations and existing analytical capacity. Literature also suggests that 
the champion be proficient in large group facilitation.179 This metric 
examines the existing special event planning frameworks in each policy 
option for opportunities to integrate a CBP champion. This metric’s 
ordinal values are “high integration opportunities,” “moderate integration 
opportunities,” and “no integration opportunities.” 
These criteria are used to evaluate the three policy options considered by this thesis, 
which are detailed within the following chapter. 
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V. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS AND OUTCOMES 
This chapter applies the previously established evaluation criteria to each policy 
option along with justifications for the qualitative measure assigned. The chapter concludes 
with an evaluation matrix and the policy option identified for implementation 
consideration.  
A. EVALUATION OF POLICY OPTIONS 
• Policy Option A: Do not integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a 
special event planning process at the local level; maintain the status quo. 
Summary: This policy option reflects no incorporation of the THIRA into special 
events planning. It assumes a locally planned special event for a notional 4th of July 
celebration with a pre-planning window of 90 days. 
Top leader participation: Since this policy option does not integrate the THIRA 
into special event planning, frequent top leader participation is not essential to any CBP 
process being initially implemented. Therefore, the metric assigned is “low participation.” 
Time for collaboration: Since the notional special event has been defined with a 
pre-planning time horizon of 90 days, the metric value assigned is “three to six months.” 
Partitioning: Contingency planning for a special event inherently includes some 
forms of partitioning, such as the formation of a public safety planning subcommittee to 
allow for more detailed plans to be developed with a more-specialized group of 
participants.180 Since this policy option does not seek to implement a CBP process that 
explicitly calls for full mission-scope portioning for all capabilities, full core capability 
partitioning planning with interdisciplinary stakeholders will likely not self-initialize. 
Therefore, the metric value “low partitioning opportunities” has been selected. 
CBP champion: As this scenario does not attempt to implement a CBP process, 
the metric value assigned is “low integration opportunities” for a CBP champion.  
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• Policy Option B: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a special 
event planning process at the local level. 
Summary: In this policy option, the THIRA is scaled down for use in special event 
planning for a notional outdoor 4th of July festival of 250,000 attendees with a Level 2 
DHS SEAR, which indicates an event requiring some level of federal support but planned 
and executed by a local government.  
Top leader participation: FEMA’s Special Events Contingency Planning Job 
Aids Manual recommends that local jurisdictions adopt the ICS and NIMS as planning and 
organizational frameworks when planning for a special event.181 Within NIMS, the final 
product of interdisciplinary planning is an IAP.182 The process outlined by FEMA is 
revised for each new operation period as incident information changes over time and the 
planning unit within the ICS structure leads this iterative process.183 Each planning process 
involves the participation of interdisciplinary stakeholders, but IAP development and 
planning guidance do not indicate where political or senior leadership is engaged in the 
process. Within the National Response Framework and ICS guidance, leadership interface 
with ICS planning structures is a vertical reporting relationship between officials and the 
jurisdiction’s emergency manager.184 Edward Conors, author of Planning and Managing 
Security for Major Special Events, recommends that law enforcement form an executive 
leadership committee to allow for tactical planning to occur at lower levels and that the 
committee holds final decision-making authority.185 However, this guidance does not 
provide a best practice on how frequently an executive leadership committee should 
convene. While locally managed special event planning frameworks indicate the need for 
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senior level interaction, they do not provide further details on how to structure those 
interactions, and therefore, the metric value assigned is “medium participation.” 
Time for collaboration: Planning horizons for a notional, annual 4th of July 
celebration in a local government setting range from 120 to 90 days.186 Therefore, the 
metric value assigned is “three to six months.” 
Partitioning: FEMA special event guidance recommends conducting tactical 
planning meetings with interdisciplinary stakeholders, which indicates that the operations 
branch within the ICS framework determines tactics.187 However, law enforcement special 
event planning guidance indicates that functional subcommittees should be formed based 
upon the scale and perceived threat level of the event.188 While the implementation of this 
guidance varies from one jurisdiction to another, the guide recommends that 
subcommittees should contain specialized units and tactical teams that conduct more 
sensitive planning in parallel. Additionally, the Department of Health and Human Services 
recommends conducting medical triage and treatment planning through functional 
subcommittees for a range of events, from inaugurations to 4th of July celebrations.189 
While FEMA and other federal special event guidance do recommend partitioning 
activities, these recommendations come specific to the disciplines that the federal agencies 
represent, and do not constitute a holistic partitioning of all core capabilities. Additionally, 
a local government planning for a SEAR 2 event must request that these federal agencies 
provide this special event planning guidance and support. Thus, engagement of federal 
resources and support for additional partitioning planning processes is left to local 
government preference. Therefore, the metric value assigned is, “moderate partitioning 
opportunities.” 
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CBP champion: FEMA special event planning frameworks encourage engaging 
all stakeholders when conducting contingency planning.190 Since the problem statement of 
this thesis identified low-adoption of the THIRA and other forms of CBP in local 
government, the policy option assumes a local CBP champion does not likely exist within 
local government. However, under a SEAR 2 event designation, a local jurisdiction can 
request federal support for planning or event operations. Since a local government can 
request FEMA support for applying CBP to mass-gathering contingency planning, the 
metric value assigned is “moderate integration opportunities.” 
• Policy Option C: Integrate the THIRA CBP framework within a NSSE.  
Summary: This option presents THIRA integration into the planning framework 
of a NSSE, which is defined as “a designated event that, due to its political, economic, 
social, or religious significance, may be the target of domestic/international criminal 
activity (terrorism) as a result of national significance and high visibility, requiring the lead 
of Secret Service.”191 Under a NSSE designation, the Secret Service is assigned as 
protection and planning lead, the FBI is assigned to counterterrorism planning, and FEMA 
leads contingency planning. Overall authority for the event is placed under the Secret 
Service and local government plays a supporting role.192 
Top leader participation—The Secret Service utilizes an executive steering 
committee (ESC) and topical subcommittee-planning framework for NSSEs.193 The Secret 
Service ESC is comprised of high-level officials from all levels of government; safety and 
security disciplines are considered; this body approves and guides operational planning 
development throughout the planning process.194 Given this continued engagement and 
decision-making authority assigned to the NSSE ESC, the metric value assigned for top 
leader engagement is “high participation.” 
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193 Connors, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events, 13. 
194 Connors, 13. 
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Time for collaboration: Law enforcement NSSE planning guidance recommends 
that planning begin 12–18 months ahead of the event. Other federal departments, like those 
supporting medical care, recommend emergency medical support planning begin nine to 
six months prior to a major event or NSSE.195 Therefore, the metric value assigned is, “six 
or more months.” 
Partitioning: The Secret Service NSSE planning framework includes, on average, 
20 functional planning subcommittees ranging from dignitary protection, transportation, 
airspace security, consequence management, to critical infrastructure.196 These groups can 
be comprised of federal, state, and local government representatives and be expanded to 
include private sector stakeholders.197 NSSEs also require substantial local resources that 
often necessitate engaging other jurisdictions through mutual aid agreements, and peer 
organizations must plan how to integrate those varied types of assets.198 Based upon the 
large amount of discipline-specific and functional planning groups comprised of 
stakeholders from all levels of government, the metric value assigned is “high partitioning 
opportunities.”  
CBP champion: FEMA chairs several planning subcommittees within a NSSE 
framework including fire life safety HAZMAT (FLSH) and consequence management.199 
Since FEMA assumes a leadership role of several committees that engage federal, state, 
and local government stakeholders, FEMA’s strategic position allows the opportunity to 
engage subject matter experts in CBP to assist with interagency planning. Due to this 
FEMA leadership role within a NSSE planning construct, the metric value assigned is 
“high integration opportunities” for a CBP champion. 
                                                 
195 The Joint Commission, Healthcare Coalition Involvement in Mass Gatherings (Oak Brook, IL: The 
Joint Commission, 2016), 18, https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/aspr-tracie-hcc-webinar-2-mass-
gatherings.pdf. 
196 Connors, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events, vii. 
197 The Joint Commission, Healthcare Coalition Involvement in Mass Gatherings, 19–29. 
198 “Anatomy of a National Special Security Event,” Domestic Preparedness, June 7, 2017, https:// 
www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/anatomy-of-a-national-special-security-event/. 
199 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Presidential Transition Records (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), 68–70, accessed November 12, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/FEMA%20Presidential%20Transition%20Records%201%20of%203.pdf. 
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B. POLICY EVALUATION MATRIX AND OPTION SELECTION 
Table 5 summarizes the output of the proceeding policy options analysis using the 
previously defined criteria. 
Table 5. Policy Options Evaluation Matrix 










Policy Option A: Do not 
integrate the THIRA CBP 
framework within a special 
event planning process at 
the local level; maintain 
the status quo 
Low 3–6 months Low Low 
Policy Option B: Integrate 
the THIRA CBP 
framework within a special 
event planning process at 
the local level 
Moderate 3–6 months Moderate Moderate 
Policy Option C: Integrate 
the THIRA CBP 
framework within a 
National Special Security 







The metrics selected to evaluate the proposed policy options are drawn from 
literature examining the best practices for CBP implementation and collaboration-enabling 
factors within emergency management planning. Section C of the previous chapter defined 
these metrics and indicated that high degrees of top leader participation, substantial time 
for interagency collaboration on a specific mission, opportunities to partition all the 
required core capabilities for a mission and integrating a CBP champion have positive 
effects on successfully implementing CBP. Therefore, as all metric rating values seek to 
be maximized in this evaluative schema to achieve successful CBP implementation, the 
assigned metric values are represented in Table 6 with a stoplight color scheme. Red 
shading indicates the lowest value of the respective metric, yellow represents the median 
metric value, and green denotes the maximum metric value. To compliment this color-
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coding, numerical scores (1–lowest metric value, 2–median metric value, 3–greatest metric 
value) have been assigned to each metric’s three potential ordinal rankings. These 
numerical rankings are indicated within parentheses in each table cell. A summation 
column can be found to the right of the Table 6. 














Policy Option A: Do 
not integrate the 
THIRA CBP 
framework within a 
special event 
planning process at 
the local level; 
maintain the status 
quo 
Low (1) 3-6 months 
(2) 
Low (1) Low (1) 4 
Policy Option B: 
Integrate the THIRA 
CBP framework 
within a special event 
planning process at 
the local level 
Moderate (2) 3-6 months 
(2) 
Moderate (2) Moderate (2) 8 
Policy Option C: 
Integrate the THIRA 
CBP framework 
within a national 
special security event 
planning process 
(NSSE) 
High (3) Greater than 
six months 
(3) 
High (3) High (3) 12 
 
From the analysis and evaluation tables, option three, integrate the THIRA into a 
NSSE planning process, is the most desirable policy option. The following chapter further 
discusses these findings, methods of potential implementation, and options for further 
research. 
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This thesis has explored how to inculcate CBP concepts at the local level by 
applying a modified THIRA planning process to mass-gathering contingency planning. 
Since DHS CBP implementation at the disaster planning level has not been optimal, 
practicing it in a lower-order but analogous environment, such as a mass gathering  
(special event) planning can allow for the adoption of mission-system analysis concepts at 
the local level. 
A. SUMMARY 
When planning for disaster preparedness at the local level, local officials must make 
risk-informed judgments about what level of capability is needed to defend against known 
threats and hazards and how to remain adaptable to address the unforeseen. However, risk 
assessment tools are imperfect and sometimes not available. PPD-8 and the THIRA process 
have sought to change this situation through the application of a variant of the military CBP 
to the homeland security enterprise, but implementation has been difficult. CBP is a method 
of system analysis that focuses on identifying and assessing the necessary elements 
required for a specific outcome under user-defined metrics of performance.200 Differing 
from military planning environments, local government efforts are complicated by a gap 
in analysis competency and local resources and assets are diffused among many 
organizations. This complication has proven to be an obstacle to the full adoption of CBP 
across governmental jurisdictions. Like criticism that DoD’s implementation of CBP 
initially suffered from lack of a common analytical schema, FEMA’s implementation 
suffers from lack of an adaptability schema to account for variations in levels of governance 
across the United States. This insufficiency has resulted in a reluctance to apply top-down 
national capability assessment frameworks. 
Synthesizing best practices from federal-level CBP efforts and effective 
collaboration approaches from emergency management, an adapted THIRA framework 
                                                 
200 Hales and Chouinard, Implementing Capability Based Planning, 1.  
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was developed. The THIRA special event framework and special event planning processes 
were explored for points of congruency in jurisdictional disaster planning. This exploration 
concluded that the THIRA framework could function as a substitute process in lieu of the 
standard NIMS linear planning framework for a mass gathering. The framework was then 
evaluated via three policy options: taking no action, applying the framework to local 
events, and applying the framework to a NSSE. These options were simulated through 
three scenarios of the THIRA CBP planning application. The outcomes were assessed by 
opportunities for top-leader participation, time for agencies to collaborate, opportunities 
for partitioning, and opportunities to integrate a CBP champion. This policy-options 
analysis has indicated that incorporating the THIRA into FEMA contingency planning 
functional subcommittees for NSSEs is a potential way to foster the adoption of CBP at 
the local level.  
NSSE’s are high-interest events that require managing large budgets, conducting 
substantial interagency planning, and specifying the need for large amounts of local 
equipment and security apparatus. NSSE planning timeframes typically operate in the 6–
12-month range and draw notable media attention, both before and during the event. 
Additionally, the current NSSE planning framework is comprised of functional 
subcommittees that address specific categories of tasks, which mirror the CBP approach of 
decomposing scenarios into unique operational challenges and then into discrete envelopes 
of capability.  
While NSSEs provide a notable set of enabling factors for implementing CBP for 
real-world events, they occur very infrequently and impact only a limited set of cities and 
states a year.201 NSSEs for political conventions shift from city to city, which means that 
local governments may practice CBP once for a NSSE and then lack the component 
incentives or enabling factors to continue using CBP. As Chapter II noted, emergency 
planning systems not inculcated into daily or frequent activities through decision support 
tools does yield diminishing results in a crisis.  
                                                 
201 Reese, National Special Security Events, 19–29. 
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It is also likely that full adoption of CBP is not possible given the variation and 
diffusion of government organizations at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial level, 
which contrasts with the (slightly) less complex military organizations within the DoD. 
This observed variation does not suggest that CBP adoption for the HSE should be 
discontinued. Davis notes that modern military planning has had decades and large 
conflicts to iterate and test planning approaches, whereas the HSE’s experience with CBP 
began in 2004.202 Despite the lack of frequency in applying the THIRA CBP framework to 
a NSSE, it may represent an opportunity for FEMA to study CBP application in a real-
world disaster-analogous setting. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Considering the variety of interdisciplinary stakeholders, applying the THIRA 
framework as a decision support tool for a special event should be limited to occurrences 
that are larger in scale and represent a notable degree of planning complexity. While 
integration into a NSSE is assessed to be favorable, implementation at the local level should 
still be explored. The DHS SEAR can provide a prompt for when the THIRA may add 
value.203 
As part of an annual data call by DHS, states and UASIs submit special events that 
have an estimated attendance of greater than 20,000 participants.204 Events are submitted 
in a database format with characteristics of each mass gathering broken down into common 
criteria and entered into specific fields to support risk analysis. Data requested by DHS 
include the participation of dignitaries, number of persons anticipated to attend, whether 
the event is enclosed within a perimeter or open to all persons, whether the event venue 
has iconic significance, etc. DHS uses a proprietary numerical evaluation of the submitted 
                                                 
202 Caudle, “Homeland Security and Capabilities-Based Planning,” 19–26. 
203 G. B. Jones, “Towards a Strategic Approach to Special Events Management in the Post-9/11 
World” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 64–65. 
204 Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative, Bay Area Large Special Events Planning Guide and 





data to provide a ranking score from five (lowest) to one (highest below a national special 
security event designation.) Federal partners use the SEAR rankings assigned to events to 
determine the level of involvement and resources that should be committed to assist state 
and local jurisdictions.205 For example, a large open-air holiday festival with an expected 
attendance of 500,000 people throughout the duration of the event is typically scored by 
DHS to be a SEAR 2. With prior FEMA approval, SEAR 1–3 events allow the utilization 
of homeland security grant program funds to cover operational costs for personnel 
supporting the event.206  
NSSE and local implementation initiatives can also be incentivized by FEMA 
through a new and specific preparedness grant that provides planning funds for initial CBP 
for a major special event. FEMA has recently incentivized active threat preparedness across 
the nation through a competitive CCTA planning grant.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis explored how CBP competency and adoption could be increased by 
applying it to tasks jurisdictions perform frequently, like preparing for special events. CBP 
was applied within the DoD as a means to increase military performance in highly 
uncertain and quickly changing environments, like terrorism. Davis simplifies the concepts 
of CBP into an approach seeking modularity, where envelopes of capability can be 
combined quickly to address a mission. The mission-system analysis process requires 
metrics of performance for the capabilities currently possessed by a jurisdiction, and 
defensible metrics remain a gap. CBP implementation can benefit from further research 
exploring how machine learning and Bayesian decision support tools can enhance 
capability estimation and decision support. 
                                                 
205 Department of Homeland Security, “Special Event Assessment Rating Methodology Background 
Information.” 
206 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2018 
Homeland Security Grant Program (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), 61–67, 
accessed October 23, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1526578809767-7f08f471f36d 
22b2c0d8afb848048c96/FY_2018_HSGP_NOFO_FINAL_508.pdf. 
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This thesis also calls for further research into strategic and tactical planning 
frameworks and stakeholder engagement methods at the local government level. 
Establishing descriptive models and sets of empirical data can lead to a greater 
understanding of how to improve planning processes across all levels of government.  
Finally, this thesis recommends research into mass gathering planning and security 
operations dynamics at the federal, state, and local level. ICS and NIMS do not fully 
account for the non-disaster planning environment and additional stakeholders. Further, 
Department of Justice and FEMA special event guidance takes the form of checklists that 
do not yet provide an adaptable organizational architecture for interdisciplinary planning.  
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